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A Kinder, Gentler Liberalism? Visions of 
Empathy in Feminist and Communitarian 
Literature 
Cynthia V. Wardt 
FEMINISM, EMPATHY, AND "LmERAL COMMUNITY" 
Both feminist and communitarian scholars have begun a 
rapprochement with liberalism in which the politicization of 
empathy plays a key role. Originally a child of liberal philoso-
phy, 1 feminist theory has moved beyond the fight for formal lib-
eral equality to a critique that turned "liberal legalism," 
liberalism's jurisprudential counterpart, from feminism's inspira-
tion into its enemy.2 But Anne Dailey concludes in a recent es-
t Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University; J.D. Yale, 1991. My warmest 
thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Jeffrie Murphy, and Fernando Teson for suggestions and 
criticisms that improved this essay. Thanks also to the Arizona State College of Law for 
summer research support. 
1 See, for example, John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in Stefan Collini, ed, 
On Liberty: with The Subjection of Women and Chapters on Socialism 117, 133-36 (Cam-
bridge, 1989) (arguing for women's legal equality on the basis of liberal principles of 
individual autonomy, self-determination, and social mobility); Deborah L. Rhode, Justice 
and Gender: Sex Discrimination and the Law 12 (Harvard, 1989) ("American feminism is 
rooted in various intellectual traditions, but the most dominant iufiuence has been liberal-
ism."). 
2 Attacks on liberalism can be found in the works of radical feminists, of whom the 
most important contemporary theorist is Catharine MacKinnon, as well as relational or 
cultural feminists, who are frequently associated with the work of Carol Gilligan. From 
the radical feminist literature, see, for example, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a 
Feminist Theory of the State 157-70, 237-49 (Harvard, 1989) (attacking the liberal state 
and liberal theory as oppressive of women). From the relational camp, see, for example, 
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 
Va L Rev 543, 579-84 (1986) (hypothesizing that women's concerns about connection, 
subjectivity, and responsibility for others accord well with communitarian legal structures 
while men's emphasis on autonomy, objectivity, and rights translates into liberalism); 
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U Chi L Rev 1, 2-4, 14-26, 42 (1988) (defend-
ing the "connection thesis"-that women differ essentially from men because they are 
materially connected to other human lives through the maternal experience and therefore 
value cennection and nurturing over autonomy-and concluding that because contempo-
rary legal theory defines human beings as physically separate from one another, it could 
never be inclusive of women). But see Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some 
Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, in Katharine T. Bartlett and Resanne 
Kennedy, eds, Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender 15 <Westview, 1991) 
(defending the liberal feminist model oflegal equality). 
929 
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say that feminism's intense focus on the questions of what differ-
ences exist between women and men, and how the law should 
respond to them, is now steering the movement toward endorsing 
a new and improved version of liberalism: "a redeemed liberalism 
in which the philosophy of possessive individualism characteristic 
of classical liberalism has been tempered by a principle of empa-
thy."a 
The concept of "empathetic liberalism" embodies simulta-
neous commitments to individualist and communitarian princi-
ples,4 an idea that would have seemed odd only a few years ago. 
But in the wake of recent scholarship attempting to dissolve the 
historically impermeable divide between liberalism and 
communitarianism, the concept of "liberal community" has 
emerged to present political and legal theory with the challenge 
of reconciling within a single political framework the liberal val-
ues of individual freedom, diversity, and selfhood with the 
communitarian vision of shared goals and collective harmony.5 
One model attempts to demonstrate that liberalism is and has 
always been a form of community, implying that no dichotomy 
3 Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 Yale L J 1265, 1266-67 
(1993), review of Katharine T. Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy, eds, Feminist Legal Theory: 
Readings in Law and Gender (Westview, 1991). The idea of "empathetic liberalism" both 
reflects the positive influence of relational and radical feminism on classical liberal 
philosophy and offers feminists a unified conceptual foundation upon which to build 
principled arguments for social justice and women's equality. See, for example, 102 Yale L 
J at 1267 ("I believe [empathetic liberalism] offers law's best hope for justice fonnded upon 
true social equality."). 
4 See, for example, id at 1267 (Empathetic liberalism is "[d]istinguished by its 
commitment to individual diversity within community .•.. "). This emphasis on communi-
ty distinguishes the communitarian/feminist vision of empathy from various claims by 
liberals that empathic understanding is an inherent· part of liberalism. See, for example, 
Susan Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice, 99 Ethics 229, 236 
(1989) (finding empathy in John Rawls's political theory, which posits that actors would 
establish a just society if they had to choose principles of justice without knowledge of 
their own positions in society); R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Leuels, Method, and Point 
16-17, 89 (Oxford, 1981) (explaining the centrality of empathic understanding to correct 
moral judgment). See also text accompanying notes 43-49. 
6 Examples of scholarship defending the dichotomy between liberalism and 
communitarianism include Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American 
Constitutional Thought, 29 Wm & Mary L Rev 57, 64-67, 73 (1987) and Sherry, 72 VaL 
Rev at 544-50 (cited in note 2). Writers rejecting the dichotomy include communitarians 
and civic republican theorists, see, for example, Frank Michehnan, Super Liberal: Ro-
mance, Community, and Tradition in William J. Brennan, Jr.'s Constitutional Thought, 77 
VaL Rev 1261, 1286-87 (1991); Frank I. Michehnan, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L J 1493, 
1495-96, 1504-06 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Reuiual, 97 Yale L J 
1539, 1551, 1561 (1988), as well as liberals. See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, We the 
People 1: Foundations 29-32 (Harvard, 1991); William A Galston, Liberal Purposes: 
Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State 43-44 (Cambridge, 1991). 
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ever existed between the two. 6 Other scholars apparently take 
the position that liberalism could become compatible with com-
munity if appropriately modified by a communitarian principle of 
"political empathy."7 Add empathy to liberalism and stir, to yield 
a form of liberal community that would simultaneously respect 
equality and individual diversity and avoid liberalism's flaws: 
selfishness, atomistic separatism, and emotionless abstraction. 
By engaging all citizens in efforts to understand and relate to 
others of different backgrounds, interests, and convictions, empa-
thy would serve as the theoretical glue to bind together the 
halves of the liberal communitarian vision.8 
In this essay I attempt to demonstrate that this feminist and 
communitarian invocation of empathy is confused and misguided. 
Only because feminist and communitarian theorists conflate two 
distinct meanings of empathy can they believe that empathy will 
simultaneously achieve equality and diversity. As integral a part 
of the classical liberal tradition as of anti-liberal critique, empa-
thy cannot validly be deployed either to attack liberal legalism or 
to construct its replacement. 
THE USES OF EMPATHY 
The scholarly portrait of empathic community evokes a com-
pelling image: citizens of all races and backgrounds sitting 
around a table, accepting each other as equal participants in 
political debate and engaging each other in consensus-forming 
6 See, for example, Ackerman, We the People at 6-7 (cited in note 5) (arguing that the 
American constitutional system has from the beginning oscillated between periods of 
deliberative, republican politics, during which citizens mobilize around "new constitution-
al solutions," and periods of "normal politics" associated with pluralist liberalism); 
Galsten, Liberal Purposes at 43 (cited in note 5) ("Liberalism does not undermine commu-
nity; it is a form of community . . . . [T]he concern for community and virtue ... is not 
only not antithetical te liberalism but perfectly consistent with liberalism rightly un-
dersteod."). Feminist scholars have recently attempted to bring the liberal theories of 
justice crafted by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin into line with key communitarian prin-
ciples. See, for example, Okin, 99 Ethics at 236 (cited in note 4); Linda C. McClain, "At-
omistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S CalL 
Rov 1171, 117 4 (1992) (arguing that "the feminist critique of liberalism as presenting an 
atemistic and unconnected conception of the person attacks a caricatured picture of 
liberalism"). 
7 See, for example, Dailey, 102 Yale L J at 1283 (cited in note 3), citing Sunstein, 97 
Yale L J at 1555 n82 (cited in note 5). 
8 See, for example, Dailey, 102 Yale L J at 1285 ("Empathetic liberalism would 
signal an end to oppositional politics and social arrangements . . . . [It] seeks to mediate 
the solipsistic tendency of traditional liberal individualism by helping all of us to become 
outspoken, engaged, and equal citizens."). 
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dialogue.9 At the core of this vision lies political empathy, which 
enables citizens to see the issues from others' points of view and 
so to learn trust and respect for people very different from them-
selves.10 Political empathy dissolves socially created hierarchy 
and fosters mutual understanding and equality amid the pres-
ence of fundamental difference.11 
On this view the root motivation for political empathy is the 
need to bring political outgroups to the table and ensure their 
effective participation in a dialogue among political equals. As 
neo-communitarian theorist Frank Michelman describes it, "the 
pursuit of political freedom12 through law depends on 'our' con-
stant reach for inclusion of the other, of the hitherto exclud-
ed-which in practice means bringing to legal-doctrinal presence 
the hitherto absent voices of emergently self-conscious social 
groups."13 
In one sense, the communitarian "citizens-around-the-table" 
vision assumes a satisfactory solution to the very problem that 
generates its call for empathic understanding-the problem of 
inequality. One could argue that once all citizens are collected 
around the table and participating in debate, political equality 
has been achieved and the need for political empathy declines. 
9 See, for example, Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1549-50 (cited in note 5) (describing the 
republican ideal of collective discussion and debate among citizens in the context of polit-
ical equality); Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional 
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 Fla L Rev 443, 447 (1989) ("Deliberative politics connotes an 
argumentative interchange among persons who recognize each other as equal in authority 
and entitlement to respect. The participants direct their argnments teward arriving at a 
reasonable answer to some question of public ordering, meaning an answer that all can 
accept as a good-faith resolution when circumstances demand some social choice."). 
10 See, for example, Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1555 (explaining the concept of political 
empathy); Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and 
Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U Pa L Rev 817, 859 (1986) (associating the 
advocacy of empathy with feminist and communitarian scholars); Nancy L. Rosenblum, 
Another Liberalism: Romanticism and the Reconstruction of Liberal Thought 184 
(Harvard, 1987) (linking communitarianism with a "politics of ... empathy"). 
11 See, for example, Judith Kegan Gardiner, Rhys, Stead, Lessing, and the Politics of 
Empathy 5 (Indiana, 1989) (noting the opposition between empathy and domination in the 
short stories of Doris Lessing); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the 
Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 Mich L Rev 2099, 2122-23 (1989) Oocating the 
call for empathy in the desire of communitarian scholars to end inequality that "consis-
tently privilege[s] some perspectives over others"). 
12 Michelman's use of the tenn "political freedom" includes the pursuit of equality. 
See, for example, Michelman, 97 Yale L J at 1526 (cited in note 5) (concluding that artic-
ulation of a "process-based, republican-not-pluralist" political vision requires "reclaiming 
the idea of jurisgenerative politics from its ancient context of hierarchical, organicist, 
solidaristic communities for the modern context of equality of respect, liberation from 
ascriptive social roles, and indissoluble plurality of perspectives"). 
13 Id at 1529. 
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Because the goal of political empathy is to allow individuals to 
transcend socially created difference and perceive essential equal-
ity, once such equality has been achieved to the point where 
citizens accept each other as equals in political debate, empathy 
has done its work. 
But the literature implies a second, more challenging role for 
empathy in situations where perceived difference still obscures 
the realization of underlying equality; that is, the need for empa-
thy arises from the imperative to create actual political equality 
represented by the metaphor of all citizens talking at a table. 
Empathy becomes necessary when only some citizens, those at 
the top of the social hierarchy, are sitting around the table, while 
others have not been allowed to take their seats. Empathic un-
derstanding is required primarily of the former group to facilitate 
the inclusion of the latter;14 it thus provides not only a modus 
vivendi for political decision making in the communitarian uto-
pia, but also an answer to the challenge frequently leveled at 
communitarians, "How do we get there?" 
But how can introducing empathy into the political arena 
produce this result? To evaluate the feminist/communitarian 
claim that it can, we need a closer look at the concept of empa-
thy-especially at what happens to that concept when scholars 
transform it from a psychological to a political principle. 
A. Meanings of Empathy 
As a psychological term, empathy denotes "[a]n awareness of 
the thoughts and feelings of another person; the capacity to un-
derstand and in some measure share another person's state of 
mind."15 The presence of empathy is said to determine the abili-
ty to create and maintain friendships and other close personal 
ties;16 its complete absence is often seen as an indication of per-
sonality disorder .17 
14 For an apparent endorsement of this idea, see Linda R. Hirshman, Nobody in Here 
But Us Chickens: Legal Education and the Virtues of the Ruler, 45 Stan L Rev 1905, 1925-
30 (1993) (maintaining that rulers must possess empathy in order to govern a diverse 
citizenry successfully). 
15 Robert M. Goldenson, 1 The Encyclopedia of Human Behavior: Psychology, Psychia-
try, and Mental Health 395 (Doubleday, 1970). 
16 See, for example, David W. Smith, The Circle of Acquaintance: Perception, Con-
sciousness, and Empathy 112 (Kluwer, 1989) (explaining that only through empathic 
perception can we become truly acquainted with others); Heinz Kohut, Introspection, 
Empathy, and the Semicircle of Mental Health, in Joseph Lichtenberg, Melvin Bornstein, 
and Donald Silver, eds, Empathy I 81, 85 (Analytic, 1984) (noting that empathy is a 
precondition for proper mothering). 
17 See, for example, Gardiner, Rhys, Stend, Lessing at 5 (cited in note 11) (noting the 
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Most of us understand empathy as the ability to "walk in 
another's shoes." Left at the social level-where persuasion, rath-
er than coercion, is the primary motor of change-the reason for 
advocating empathy is clear: Wouldn't it be nice if we all made 
more of an effort to understand others' points of view before 
condemning them as strange or wrong? The answer, of course, is 
yes. But moving empathy into the political and legal arenas re-
quires the delineation not only of empathy's substance but of its 
process; we must understand not only what empathy is but also 
how it works. 
Scholarly efforts to explain the process of empathizing have 
brought forth as the basis for analysis a definition of empathy 
that is at once familiar and vague. Philosopher David Woodruff 
Smith, for example, defines empathy as "understanding another's 
experience from the other's point of view, projecting oneself into 
the other's place as subject of her experience."18 This definition 
has the advantage of explaining both what empathic understand-
ing is and how it comes about. But it also suggests two very 
distinct-and potentially conflicting-understandings of empathy, 
both of which legal scholars have used in promoting political 
empathy. Sometimes these scholars employ empathy to mean· 
"projecting oneself into the other's place as subject of her exper-
ience," a definition that places empathic understanding at the 
center of hopes for political equality; at other times, empathy 
means "understanding another's experience from the other's point 
of view," a definition that contemplates empathic engagement as 
a way of achieving political diversity.19 
opposition of empathy to narcissism in fiction of Christina Stead); James S. Grotstein, 
Some Perspectiues on Empathy from Others and Toward Oneself, in Lichtenberg, et al, 
eds, Empathy I 201, 206-07 (cited in note 16) (stating that narcissistic defects may be 
explained as failures to develop empathic ability); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and 
Empathy, 85 MichL Rev 1574, 1583 (1987) ("[R]epeated studies seem te validate there-
lation of lack of empathy to sociopathic persons .... "). 
18 Smith, Circle of Acquaintance at 112. In her insightful article, Henderson contends 
that the word "empathy" captures "three basic phenomena": 
(1) feeling the emotion of another; (2) understanding the experience or situation of 
another, both affectively and cognitively, often achieved by imagining oneself to be in 
the position of the other; and (3) action brought about by experiencing the distress of 
another ...• 
85 Mich L Rev at 1579. The analysis in this essay focuses on the second element in 
Henderson's definition of empathy. 
19 These definitions may not, of course, reflect the way the concept of empathy is used 
in other fields, such as psychology. In this essay I employ the psychological and anthropo-
logical literature about empathy to argue that: 1) the concepts of empathic understanding 
employed by feminists and communitarians have roots in our actual behavior and in our 
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B. Empathy and Equality: Projective Empathy 
Communitarian and feminist scholars have expressed the 
hope that empathic engagement will lead citizens of widely dif-
ferent backgrounds and interests to engage in dynamic, dialogic 
interactions that both accept others as political equals and pro-
duce societal institutions that will recognize and perpetuate that 
equality.20 Indeed, some communitarians and feminists explicit-
ly blame the inequalities present under ''liberal legalism" on the 
alleged absence of empathy in liberal societies.21 On this view, 
"real" equality is not merely a matter of liberal "equal rights," 
but requires that all individuals be able, through empathic inter-
action, to see the essential humanity of those whose race, gender, 
socioeconomic background, or sexual orientation are different 
from theirs.22 Empathy is thus the enemy of hierarchy and the 
characterization of it, and 2) the attempted transfer of empathy from a psychological to a 
political concept creates intractable problems. 
20 See, for example, Dailey, 102 Yale L J at 1285 (cited in note 3) ("Empathetic liber-
alism seeks to mediate the solipsistic tendency of traditional liberal individualism by 
helping all-of us to become outspoken, engaged, and equal citizens."); Sunstein, 97 Yale L 
J at 1548-58 (cited in noto 5) (describing the four basic principles of the "republican 
revivalist" movement-deliberation, political equality, universalism, and citizenship-and 
explaining the importance of empathy to their realization). As I argue below, the princi-
ples outlined here apply however one defines equality-as equality of respect, of 
personhood, or of material result. See text accompanying notes 83-84. 
21 See, for example, Dailey, 102 Yale L J at 1285 (cited in note 3). But see McClain, 
65 S Cal L Rev at 1203-09, 1218-23 (cited in note 6) (disputing the idea that the liberal 
philosophies esponsed by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin are devoid of empathy and 
cormection). 
22 There are two relevant meanings of equality here. The first relates to the presence 
of empathy among the citizenry. Can empathy promote equality only if all citizens ex-
ercise it to the same, or nearly the same, degree? Does the achievement of political 
equality require an equal amount of empathic understanding in every citizen? In a 
communitarian utopia, the answer would seem to be yes, because it would be necessary 
for all those seated at the political table to be able to understand the others' viewpoints. 
But in a world in which some groups have been effectively excluded from the discussion, 
communitarians focus on a second meaning of equality. This meaning emphasizes not the 
equal capacity for empathy in all citizens, but its usefulness in producing political 
equality via the promotion of empathic ability among only some citizens-the "insiders" 
already seated at the political table. Empathy's advocatos emphasize that the focus of 
such empathy must be "outgroups" such as women and people of color. See, for example, 
Michelman, 97 Yale L J at 1529 (cite in note 5). Empathy, in short, is to be encouraged 
within society's privileged ranks and used within existing social hierarchy to produce 
political equality. 
Given the empirical evidence that the capacity for empathy does not naturally occur 
in equal proportions among citizens-in fact, that individuals' empathic abilities vary 
considerably, see, for example, Goldenson, Encyclopedia at 395-96 (cited in note 15)-we 
mnst assume for the sake of argument that empathy can be taught. This is by no means 
proven, see, for example, id at 396, but the argument for political empathy cannot survive 
a centrary conclusion. 
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friend of subordinated groups such as women and minorities.23 
To evaluate this vision of empathic understanding, we must 
know the nature ofthe relationship between empathy and equali-
ty. Is there a natural affinity? That is, does the experience of 
empathy require, complement, and/or produce a realization of 
equality between the empathizer and the object of her efforts? 
The answer depends on how we conceive empathy. 
Consider a view of empathy as "projecting oneself into the 
other's place as subject of her experience." Imagine a machine 
capable of transporting the incorporeal "self" of one individual, 
the empathizer, from his or her own body and life circumstances 
and into those of another. This metaphor seems to capture the 
meaning of empathy as "putting yourself in the other person's 
place."24 Supposing, for example, that "I" happen to be a white 
female law professor, how differently would "I" feel, and about 
what issues, if my "self" were suddenly encased in a male body? 
If I were suddenly to become a person of color? If I were to find 
myself experiencing the life of a politician, a waitress, or a con-
struction worker? 
This vision of empathy offers many opportunities to "under-
stand and ... share another person's state of mind";25 it there-
fore qualifies as a genuine interpretation of empathy rather than 
some other idea. Indeed, both fact-based and fictional examples of 
this "projective" type of empathy are well-known in our culture. 
One famous example appears in the book Black Like Me,26 in 
which John Howard Griffin chronicles the true story of his deci-
sion to disguise himself as a black man to experience directly, 
from the black perspective, the American racial climate of the 
1960s. 
23 See, for example, Michelman, 97 Yale L J at 1524, 1529 (cited in note 5) (outlining 
a communitarian vision he labels "dialogic constitutionalism" and suggesting that, under 
it, "the pursuit of political freedom through law depends on 'our' constant reach for inclu-
sion of the other, of the hitherto excluded-which in practice means bringing to legal-
doctrinal presence the hitherto absent voices of emergently self-conscious social groups"); 
Dailey, 102 Yale L J at 1285 (cited in note 3) (claiming the feminist commitment to 
empathic narrative "offers the hope of improving the empathetic understanding of listen-
ers with power ..• "). 
24 It also avoids the threshold question of whether empathy is even possible, the 
answer to which would require an inquiry into the possibility of knowing other minds, an 
undertaking beyond the scope of this essay. The goal here is to examine the claims made 
for empathy in the light most favorable to them; assuming that empathy is possible, what 
can it achieve politically? · 
25 Goldenson, Encyclopedia at 395 (cited in note 15). 
26 (Houghton Miftl.in, 2d ed 1977). 
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Of course the concept of empathy relies on the empathizer's 
imagination rather than his actually living the life of another. 
But this does not paralyze the argument. One can easily imagine, 
for example, how projective empathy might be very useful in the 
feminist fight for women's equality. Suppose, to take a typical 
example, that a woman receives repeated unwanted sexual ad-
vances from her boss but remains reluctant to file a lawsuit or 
quit her job. A successful man might react with incomprehension, 
or even contempt, to her situation; he might think: "I would nev-
er suffer such an indignity without leaving" or "I would never let 
him get away with it; fd sue!"27 Or perhaps the man simply con-
siders sexual harassment a trivial matter not worth agonizing 
over. The transporter exercise might lead a thoughtful man to 
reconsider; looking through the eyes of the woman, he would see 
the gender-based constraints imposed on her by, for example, low 
pay, lack of demand for workers in her job, family responsibili-
ties, and the consequent need for a steady income.28 Given this 
opportunity, a reasonable man would realize that the dignity-
conferring decisions that seem so easy from a position of econom-
ic comfort and professional prestige become much more difficult 
when standing in the shoes of a woman who is sexually ha-
rassed.29 
27 This would be a case of classic projection, of ascribing one's own feelings to others 
without attempting to "walk in their shoes." As many have noted, projection alone should 
not be confused with empathy. See, for example, Henderson, 85 Mich L Rev at 1651 (cited 
in note 17) (discussing the difference between empathy and projection); Martha Minow, 
Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law 154 (Cornell, 1990) 
(perceiving, and criticizing, this type of projection in the work of John Rawls and con-
trasting it with empathy); Seyla Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The 
Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory, in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla L. 
Cornell, eds, Feminism as Critique: On the Politics of Gender 77, 88-89 (Minnesota, 1987). 
28 According to statistics compiled by the United States Department of Labor, more 
than 34 percent of employed women worked in clerical jobs as recently as 1982. Nearly 20 
percent were service workers; some 17 percent were professional and technical workers. 
In 1981, median earnings for all women were 59.2 percent of men's earnings. Among the 
5.9 million families maintained by women workers, 22 percent had incomes below the 
poverty line. See Time of Change: 1983 Handbook on Women Workers, U.S. Department of 
Labor Bulletin 298 at 55-56, 82, 103 (1983). 
29 In her book Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, radical feminist Catharine 
MacKinnon suggests that the sexual domination of women is directly related to their 
relative ecenomic poverty; that, in effect, women are kept poor to be available for sexual 
harassment: 
[Olver time, women have been economically exploited, relegated to domestic slavery, 
forced into motherhood, sexually objectified, physically abused, used in denigrating 
entertainment, deprived of a voice and authentic culture, and disenfranchised and 
excluded from public life. Women, by contrast with cemparable men, have systemat-
ically been subjected to physical insecurity; targeted for sexual denigration and vio-
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As others have pointed out, the understanding gained 
through projective empathy is both rational and emotional.30 
The imaginative projection of oneself into another's body makes 
possible not only the acquisition of relevant new data about the 
other's situation but also direct sharing of the other's feelings. In 
the case of sexual harassment, these feelings may include fear, 
revulsion, guilt, anger, and denial. 
It follows that the usefulness of projective empathy derives 
directly from its conversion of the empathizer's self-interest into 
the interest of another; one can be confident that this conversion 
will take place without making utopian assumptions about in-
nate human goodness. That is, through imaginative transporta-
tion into another's circumstances, one's self-interest operates to 
benefit the other. When "I" am suddenly living the experiences of 
another, I come to understand the other in the intimate way that 
I understand myself. Projective empathy, then, draws its power 
of understanding not from feelings of altruism but from feelings 
of self-regard.31 Extending help to the other becomes, psychologi-
cally, extending help to oneself; one's judgment is emotionally 
won over to the other person's point of view, which has, through 
empathic understanding, imaginatively become one's own. 
Most of us have experienced a limited form of projective 
empathy as analogy. By comparing some part of our own experi-
ence to another's similar experience, we gain a new understand-
ing of that other person. For example, current legal scholarship 
frequently compares the experiences of victimization suffered by 
different social groups, such as racial minorities and women, in 
lation; depersonalized and denigrated; deprived of respect, credibility, and resources; 
and silenced-and denied public presence, voice, and representation of their inter-
ests. Men as men have generally not had these things done to them .... Men have 
done these things to women. 
MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State at 160-61 (cited in note 2). 
One need not press this far to make the necessary point here. I merely note that sta-
tistically, and despite substantial progress in recent decades, women as a group remain 
poorer than men. This fact might differentially influence the responses of each gender to a 
situation of sexual harassment. 
30 See, for example, Henderson, 85 Mich L Rev at 1576 (cited in note 17) ("[E]mpathy 
is a form of understanding, a phenomenon that encompasses affect as well as cognition in 
determining meanings ..•. "). 
31 For variations on this idea in liberal theory, see, for example, Hare, Moral Think· 
ing at 124-29 (cited in noto 4) (describing the process by which empathic understanding 
equates one's own interest with the interests of others); Okin, 99 Ethics at 244 (cited in 
note 4) (claiming that the Rawlsian veil of ignorance mandates empathic understanding 
because it "converts what would, without [the veil], be self-interest into benevolence or the 
equal concern for others"). 
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the hope of deepening mutual understanding among the victims 
of racism and sexism. 32 Analogizing the experiences of others to 
one's own creates a feeling of involvement in the lives of others 
and leads to a deeper understanding ofthem.33 
One might well conclude from this that projective empathy 
does produce a sense of equality between empathizer and object. 
To "understand" the other means to perceive through one's em-
pathic efforts that, if one's own circumstances were those of the 
other, one could in fact hold the other's preferences, behave as 
the other does, or even be that other; that you and she are, in 
some essential way, the same and therefore equal. Empathy is 
psychological dynamite which blasts through apparent difference 
to uncover essential sameness. 
But this conclusion requires an examination of what, exactly, 
it means to ''project one's self into the shoes of another." As the 
philosopher R.M. Hare put it, "[I]f all the properties of the situa-
tion in which I had to imagine myself, including the properties of 
the person in whose shoes I was putting myself, were so unlike 
those of myself and my present situation, would it any longer be 
me?"34 
It is immediately clear that to produce the salutary effects 
described above, projective empathy requires more than the 
imagined transfer of one's being into the events of another 
person's life. At this level one is engaged in mere projection, 
assigning to the other one's own acquired values and personali-
ty.35 If projective empathy is to help achieve real understanding 
32 Legal scholars have commented on both the prevalence and the dangers of this 
kind of comparison. For example, Trina Grillo and Stephanie M. Wildman argue that 
"[c]omparing other oppression to race gives whites a false sense that they fully under-
stand the experience of people of color." Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implica-
tion of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -isms), 1991 Duke L J 
397,405. They emphasize that "[t]he comparison minimizes the impact of racism .... " Id 
at 401. 
33 See Louis Agosta, Empathy and Intersubjectivity, in Lichtenberg, et al, eds, 
Empathy I 43, 56-57 (cited in note 16) (discussing analogizing as a way of"initiat[ing] the 
activity of empathic receptivity"). 
34 Hare, Moral Thinking at 119 (cited in note 4). For charges that the "self" is insep-
arable from the social circumstances that create difference, see generally Benhabib, The 
Generalized and the Concrete Other at 86-95 (cited in note 27); Michael J. Sandel, Liber-
alism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, 1982). 
35 See note 27 and the accompanying text. A wonderful fictional example of projection 
is embodied in the character of Mr. Woodhouse, the heroine's father in Jane Austen's 
novel Emma (Zodiac, lOth ed 1983). Mr. Woodhouse was widely beloved for his compas-
sion and concern for others-but these qualities were rooted in his unthinking belief that 
others were like himself. These "habits of gentle selfishness, and of being never able to 
suppose that other people could feel differently from himself" set severe, and often ab-
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of "outsiders," it must do more. It must at least require that the 
empathizer attempt to imagine herself in the events of the 
other's life with the other's politically relevant differences-for 
example, with the other person's race, gender, or socioeconomic 
class. 
But which differences are politically relevant? Can we really 
answer this?36 Suppose that we can. The next question is 
Hare's: What is left of the "self" once it has taken on the life and 
politically relevant differences of another? There are two possible 
answers to this question: 1) nothing, in which case projective 
empathy becomes either impossible or useless; and 2) something 
independent of individual experience and difference, perhaps 
something approximating what Zeno Vendler described as "the 
bare form of consciousness," an abstract quality of personhood 
that all humans share. 37 This quality of consciousness serves as 
the means by which one person imaginatively "walks in the 
shoes" of another. 
Feminists and coinmunitarians flatly reject the abstract, 
universal idea of the self upon which projective empathy rests,38 
and I discuss the consequences of that rejection below.39 It does 
seem clear that the concept of projective empathy as developed 
here contradicts the idea that empathy and liberal individualism 
are opposed, or, in a weaker sense, that liberalism is something 
to which empathy can be added to achieve a better society. In 
fact, it appears from the discussion above that projective empa-
thy is not only positively related to abstract liberal equality, but 
actually gave birth to it. If one function of empathic understand-
ing is to enable citizens to see behind apparent differences to the 
surd, limits on his ability to comprehend others. Id at 7. For example, he finds it hard to 
comprehend the desire of his older daughter to marry, "though it had been entirely a 
match of affection," since he could never envision leaving the family home of Hartfield. Id. 
And because he had a digestive problem that prohibitod him from eating rich food, he was 
miserable when anyone else did so, since "[w]hat was unwholesome to him, he regarded 
as unfit for any body .... " Id at 15. 
36 For a feminist claim that we cannot, see Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist 
Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 Yale L J 1373, 1377-80 (1986). 
37 Hare, Moral Thinking at 119-21 (cited in note 4); Zeno Vendler, A Note to the 
Paralogisms, in Gilbert Ryle, ed, Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy 111, 117 (Oriel, 
1976) ("How can I •.• take on another essence as it were, albeit in the 
imagination? ... The answer is that the 'I,' the subject of such a transference[,] has no 
content and no essence; it is a mere frame in which any picture fits; it is the bare form of 
consciousness."). 
38 See, for example, Henderson, 85 Mich L Rev at 1591 (cited in note 17); Dailey, 102 
Yale L J at 1278-85 (cited in note 3). 
39 See text accompanying notes 53-81. 
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essential humanity of all persons, then empathy is the source of 
abstract liberal equality and liberal legalism, which posit that all 
persons are equal and that the law must recognize this fact. 
Politically and legally, projective empathy translates into the 
idea that each individual should accord all other selves equal 
respect, since if "I" were literally in your shoes, I could well be-
have and believe as you do. 
Equality, here, is based on sameness-on the essential, and 
politically relevant, similarity between human beings-and this 
analysis leads quickly to endorsement of the same abstract, liber-
al visions of self that feminist and communitarian critics hope 
political e:q1pathy will counteract.40 Projective empathy, on this 
view, adds nothing to liberalism; it is in fact a core premise of 
liberal justice. 
This conclusion does not mean that projective empathy has 
no implications for social reform; quite the contrary. If, as I con-
cluded above, empathic understanding can produce a sense of 
equality between persons, it seems likely that empathy can result 
in a realization of the unjust inequalities created by law. Sup-
pose, for example, that whites and blacks in America live under a 
system of legal segregation that is enforced by the majority white 
culture and is, from the perspective of most whites, "separate but 
equal." Since the concept of "separate but equal" seems theoret-
ically possible-that is, there is nothing logically impossible 
about constructing such a system-the actual inequality of the 
system may remain unobserved until whites begin to imagine 
themselves living under it as black people. The violation of the 
liberal idea of equality becomes apparent only when one sees 
how, in the context of slavery and its racist aftermath, segrega-
tion labels blacks as inferior to whites. 
Indeed, projective empathy may have motivated the most 
revered court case in the history of liberal civil-rights reform: 
Brown v Board of Education.41 Lynne Henderson, in a recent 
search for empathy in Supreme Court opinions, identified Brown 
as the result of empathic understanding by the Court. Henderson 
never explores the concept of projective empathy,42 yet her conclu-
sion that Brown is an empathic decision seems powerful once one 
40 See, for example, Dailey, 102 Yale L J at 1278-85 (contrasting the traditional liber-
al idea of selfhood with a vision of "empathetic liberalism"). See generally Benhabib, The 
Generalized and the Concrete Other at 27 (cited in note 27). 
41 34 7 us 483 (1954). 
42 Henderson, 85 MichL Rev at 1593-1609 (cited in note 17). 
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deploys the concept of projective empathy to analyze it. Through 
empathic engagement with blacks, the Supreme Court perceived 
the inequality inherent in legally mandated segregation. The 
Court therefore realized ·that segregation violated the liberal 
equality-ideal believed to exist in the Constitution and concluded 
that segregation must be stopped. 
It appears, in short, that projective empathy does contain a 
premise of equality-but one that is based on the liberal model of 
abstract individualism. In fact, here the notion of empathy actu-
ally bleeds into the definition of abstraction itself, since it is the 
essence of the latter imaginatively to consider and categorize the 
commonalities of distinct entities apart from their differences.43 
Empathy's claim to true understanding rests on the idea that 
when "I" project my "self' into your circumstances, "I" recognize 
you as an equal, or in the more typical case, I come to acknow-
ledge that we are equal despite our differences. This capacity of 
projective empathy to create feelings of equality between individ-
uals appears to distinguish it from related concepts that have 
been employed by liberal philosophers like Hare, Okin, and 
Rawls.44 For example, though he never employs the term "empa-
thy," Hare's analysis of moral judgments relies significantly on 
our ability to put ourselves in the positions of others who will be 
affected by our judgments, in order to discover their preferenc-
es.45 Similarly, Susan Moller Okin argues that the Rawlsian veil 
of ignorance forces everyone behind the veil to consider equally 
the situations and perspectives of all. 46 Both of these views ap-
pear to assume a prior principle of equality upon which empathic 
understanding builds. 
But political empathy must achieve more. Political dialogue, 
after all, begins with the expression of different preferences; 
empathy is needed here not only to discover such preferences, but 
43 Webster's defines "abstraction" as "the act or process of imaginatively isolating or 
considering apart the common properties or characteristics of distinct objects." Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 8 (1961). 
44 None of these philosophers actually analyzes the process of empathic understand-
ing, and I cannot, therefore, associate any of them with the concept of "projective empa-
thy" as developed in this essay. 
45 Hare argues that to accept the universality of a moral prescription, we must "sat-
isfy ourselves that we can accept the universal application of the prescription; and this 
includes its application were we in the other's position." Moral Thinking at 89 (cited in 
note 4). Doing this requires knowing facts about the other's position and his preferences. 
Id at 90-95. 
46 Okin, 99 Ethics at 244 (cited in note 4) ("[S]ince one does not know which person 
one will turn out to be, one's rational self-interest presumably directs one to being equally 
concerned for each."). 
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also to allow us to understand their origins and justifications. 
Beginning from difference, as expressed in different preferences, 
we are asked to acknowledge the justice of those preferences via 
empathic engagement with each other. Empathy must create a 
sense that the outsider's claims are just; it does so by making us 
realize that were we in the circumstances of the other's life, we 
would also make her claims. This capacity of empathic interac-
tion to create a sense of equality is vital to empathy's potential to 
combat racism and sexism, both of which are based on a convic-
tion of the inferiority of others. In terms of legal rights, it is also 
consistent with the liberal progression from "equal treatment" to 
the idea that equality is better expressed as "equal concern,"47 
"equal acceptance,"48 or "equal opportunity.''49 Once one 
empathically realizes that the circumstances of another make her 
request for special treatment just, one can, within the framework 
of liberalism, move away from an equal-treatment model of law. 
Of course, liberal equality and projective empathy may in 
fact be mutually reinforcing; just as empathic engagement may 
lead to a belief in essential equality among human beings, a 
belief in equality may generate a desire for, or a duty to employ, 
empathic understanding. Suppose, for example, that as a good 
liberal, I begin by believing that all persons deserve equal re-
spect. That belief may itself be the result of empathic under-
standing. Once I have this conviction, however, it may in turn 
motivate me to perceive the essential humanity of others despite 
apparent difference; that is, the liberal assumption that all hu-
mans are worthy of equal respect may lead to a desire to empa-
thize with others. 
Communitarians want to reject the conclusion that political 
empathy is a basic component of liberalism. Yet that conclusion 
seems unavoidable.50 If projective empathy is possible, it relies 
47 See Ronald M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 180, 272-78 (Harvard, 1977). 
48 See Christine A Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal L Rev 1279, 
1284-85 (1987). 
49 See Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 Berkeley 
Women's L J 1, 26-27 (1985). 
110 This argument applies whether or not the object of empathic understanding is a 
human being. Webster's defines "empathy" as "the imaginative projection of a subjective 
state whether affective, conative, or cognitive into an object so that the object appears to 
be infused with it: the reading of one's own state of mind or conation into an object." 
Webster's at 742 (cited in note 43). This is often the meaning implied in references to 
artists as empathic. For example, in a powerful description of empathic connection one of 
John Keats's friends observed: "[Keats] bas affirmed that he can conceive of a billiard Ball 
that it may have a sense of delight from its own roundness, smoothness •.• volubility & 
the rapidity of its motion." Richard Woodhouse, Notes on a Letter from Keats, in Hyden 
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on an abstract liberal vision of the self; to the extent that femi-
nists and communitarians reject that vision of the self-that is, 
·to the extent that "I" am more than "a mere frame in which any 
picture fits"51-projective empathy becomes difficult or impossi-
ble. If the self is inseparable from its social circumstances, as 
feminists and communitarians claim, it follows that when I em-
ploy projective empathy to understand someone else's circum-
stances, I inevitably bring the foundational parts of my 
"self" -my own intelligence, self-esteem, and courage, as well as 
my gender, race, and socioeconomic background-to the experi-
ence in a way that prevents any deep understanding of the other. 
Only if the other person is substantially the same as I am-that 
is, shares my social circumstances-is there no distortion of un-
derstanding. 
It seems to follow that diversity and projective empathy do 
not mix well. If there is no universal element in human selfhood, 
then any individual "I" can fully empathize only with others 
whose self-developing experiences are at least closely analogous 
to its own; in short, projective empathy will not allow us to tran-
scend the social differences, such as race, gender, and socioecon-
omic background, that contribute to the formation of the "self." 
If this is right, employing projective empathy politically will 
bring only disaster. Though it might lead to mutual understand-
ing and increasing closeness within different social groups-for 
example, among whites, among blacks, and perhaps among wom-
en-it could make empathy between groups impossible since, by 
hypothesis, socially created differences cannot be transcended in 
order to achieve it. Political use of projective empathy might 
therefore create an impasse between groups that have no hope of 
understanding each other, as well as a growing feeling of alien-
ation from each other-in short, it may lead to the opposite of the 
communitarian goal. In such a context, political dialogue becomes 
a war between groups for advantage rather than a cooperative 
effort for the common good. Thus, projective empathy will either 
add nothing to political liberalism or lead us toward a balkanized 
society where political muscle, rather than empathic exchange, 
Edward Rollins, ed, 1 The Keats Circle: Letters and Papers 1816·1878 57, 59 (Harvard, 2d 
ed 1965). See also Alfred Margulies, The Empathic Imagination 15 (Norton, 1989). This 
type of empathic engagement treats the object as having a human consciousness; that is, 
it does not answer the question, "How does a billiard ball feel?" -obviously a billiard ball 
has no feelings at all-but rather the question, "How would I feel if I, my human con-
sciousness, were transplanted into the form of a billiard ball?" 
51 Vendler, Paralogisms at 117 (cited in note 37). 
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decides political contests-hardly an arrangement communitari-
ans could endorse. 
But perhaps another interpretation of empathy is possible. 
Unlike projective empathy, this type might reject liberal assump-
tions about the universalizable self and insist that diversity goes 
"all the way down"-that there is no essential identity common to 
all human beings and upon which politics and law may legiti-
mately be constructed. Critics of liberalism appear to make this 
claim. 52 Is such an interpretation of empathy viable? 
C. Empathy and Diversity: Imaginative Empathy 
Feminist and communitarian scholars advocate empathy as a 
means to promote diversity and to higlight liberalism's failure to 
do so. Under this view, liberal philosophy's focus on abstraction, 
on the design of a universal human personality-the autono-
mous, rational, self-maximizing, freedom-loving individu-
al-around which to organize political and legal institutions, 
results in a society that suppresses diversity and punishes those 
whose cultural or socioeconomic backgrounds make them unable 
or unwilling to behave in ways that liberal legalism proclaims 
"rational."53 Empathy is thus injected into the political system to 
bring law to earth, to force it to recognize and grapple with the 
actual diversity in the lives of citizens rather than assume spe-
ciously "objective" theories about human nature.54 
52 See, for example, Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, in Katherine T. 
Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy, eds, Feminist Legal Theory 370, 392 (Westview, 1991) 
("(T]he source of community [is] its diversity."); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 
1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv L Rev 4, 32 (1986) ("The 
human universal becomes difference itself. Difference is what we most fundamentally 
have in common."). 
53 See, for example, Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of 
Difference, in Linda J. Nicholson, ed, Feminism/Postmodernism 300, 307 (Routledge, 
1990) (Liberalism "denies difference by positing the self as a solid, self-sufficient unity, 
not defined by or in need of anything or anyone other than itself."); Marl J. Matsuda, 
Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of 
Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 NM L Rev 613, 619-20 (1986). 
54 See, for example, Dailey, 102 Yale L J at 1285 (cited in note 3). I should note that 
feminists and communitarians do not always agree that all universal principles are use-
less; in fact, some communitarian work can be read as favoring the construction of a 
universal "common good" through egalitarian, dialogic politics. For a discussion of this 
disagreement, see id at 1284 (criticizing Cass Sunstein for "remain[ing] loyal to a notion 
of 'universalism,'" and arguing that "[b]ecause of its commitment to a politics of diversity, 
feminist narrative is compatible with only the weakest version of [communitarian] civic 
republicanism, under which the 'common good' means little more than pluralist compro-
mise"). Nevertheless, communitarians agree with feminists in condemning abstract 
individualism or any universal construction that denies diversity. See, for example, 
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This understanding of empathy is explicitly "contextual" and 
is frequently connected to the methodology of story-telling, which 
strives through narrative to illustrate the gap between liberal 
"formal equality" and the lived experience of disadvantaged 
groups, and to use evidence of that gap to reconstruct jurispru-
dence "from the bottom."55 Dailey, for example, explicitly links 
the feminist use of narrative to the need for empathy: 
To be effective ... the call to narrative must do more than 
give voice to women's stories. The feminist reconstructive 
effort requires that the stories be heard; women's stories 
must be received with the creative understanding of an 
empathetic listener. Empathy in this context "enables the 
decisionmaker to have an appreciation of the human mean-
ings of a given legal situation." Narrative can transcend 
human difference only when the listener responds to the 
story of another by seeking out traces of her own experi-
ence.56 
Perhaps paradoxically, empathy-based promotion of diversity 
has been firmly opposed to individualism.57 Scholars depict lib-
eral philosophy as imposing identical personalities on all individ-
uals, thus destroying, or at least denying, diversity.58 Their hope 
is that increased understanding of others through empathic en-
gagement will lead to the recognition that diversity cannot be 
contained with the liberal framework positing the fundamental 
similarity of human beings but instead goes "all the way 
down."59 In addition, these critics view the physical individual 
Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1585-89 (cited in note 5) (defending the idea of proportional 
representation based on the right of disadvantaged groups and others to diversify views 
expressed in government fora). Additionally, communitarians' notion of a "common good" 
often appears to be little more than "pluralist compromise." See generally id. It therefore 
makes sense to discuss feminist and communitarian critiques of liberalism together. 
55 See, for example, Marl J .. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering 
the Victim's Story, 87 MichL Rev 2320, 2322 (1989) (defending the narrative methodology 
of "outsider jurisprudence-jurisprudence derived from considering stories from the 
bottom-[to] help resolve the seemingly irresolvable conflicts of value and doctrine that 
characterize liberal thought"). . 
56 Dailey, 102 Yale L J at 1278 (cited in note 3), citing Henderson, 85 MichL Rev at 
1576 (cited in note 17). 
57 Or at least describes it as a method of changing liberal individualism for the 
better. See generally Dailey, 102 Yale L J at 1278. 
58 See, for example, toxt accompanying note 53. 
58 See, for example, Dailey 102 Yale L J at 1279 ("Many feminists now locate 'the 
source of community in its diversity,' affirming Frank Michehnan's paradoxical iusight: 
'The human universal becomes difference itself. Difference is what.we most fundamentally 
have in common.'"). 
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not as a pre-political unit that remains unchanged by the com-
munity, but as fundamentally constructed by, and bound to, his 
or her society. Political empathy is thus designed both to encour-
age the recognition of bottomless human diversity and to locate it 
within a viable theory of community.60 
Unlike liberal projective empathy, a second understanding of 
the concept would remain true to the feminist and 
communitarian value for context-based analysis ofhuman behav-
ior and acknowledgment of human diversity. As we have seen, 
projective empathy is inescapably self-focused-indeed, it works 
only to the extent that it is self-focused. Under this interpreta-
tion, empathy operates as "projecting oneself into the other's 
place as subject .... "61 
In contrast, a second interpretation of empathy would place 
more weight on empathy as "understanding another's experience 
from the other's point of view."62 This conception thus forces a 
de-emphasis of the empathizer's self in order to freely construct a 
picture of the other that simnltaneously recognizes the funda-
mental diversity of individuals and their imaginative capacity to 
understand and connect with each other across the lines of social-
ly created difference. 
Something like this concept has appeared in the literature of 
anthropology and psychotherapy. The cultural anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz, for example, has written: 
In all three of the societies I have studied intensively, Java-
nese, Balinese, and Moroccan, I have been concerned, among 
other things, with attempting to determine how the people 
who live there define themselves as persons, what goes into 
the idea they have ... of what a self, Javanese, Balinese, or 
Moroccan style, is. And in each case, I have tried to get at 
this most intimate of notions not by imagining myself some-
one else, a rice peasant or a tribal sheikh, and then seeing 
what I thought, but by searching out and analyzing the 
60 See, for example, Michelman, 41 Fla L Rev at 450 (cited in note 9) ("According 
to ... the 'dialogic conception' [ ] of the self in society, a person's identity is partially 
constituted by that person's social situation, and personal freedom accordingly depends en 
a capacity for self-critical reconsideration oftbe socially embedded ends and commitments 
that partly make one who one is."); Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1549 (cited in note 5) ("The 
republican position is ... that existing desires should be revisable in light of collective 
discussion and debate, bringing to bear alternative perspectives and additional informa-
tion."). 
61 Smith, Circle of Acquaintance at 112 (cited in note 16) (emphasis added). 
62 Id (emphasis added). 
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symbolic forms-words, images, institutions, behaviors-in 
terms of which, in each place, people actually represented 
themselves to themselves and to one another.63 
According to Geertz, "[t]he ethnographer does not, and, in my 
opinion, largely cannot, perceive what his informants perceive. 
What he perceives, and that uncertainly enough, is what they 
perceive with .... In the country of the blind ... the one-eyed is 
not king, he is spectator ."64 
It would be natural to ask how this role as "spectator" in-
volves empathy at all, rather than purely cognitive analysis. 
Geertz, in fact, seems to contrast his own methodology with em-
pathy.65 Psychiatrist Alfred Margulies suggests a possible re-
sponse: "imaginative empathy."66 Margnlies discusses his use of 
· "imaginative empathy" first to visualize his patients' characters 
and then to interpret their behavior. 67 Here empathy becomes 
not the placement of one's "self" in another's shoes, or even the 
analogizing of the other's experiences to one's own; rather, it 
becomes the conscious setting aside of the self in order to con-
struct the unique self of the patient, followed by the imaginative 
transformation of one's picture of the other into insights that can 
help her bring latent, unconfronted parts of herself to conscious-
ness. Margulies describes the experience of imaginative empathy: 
With one patient, for example, I recall a farm in my mind's 
eye, the fields, the roads, the old lady who fed the pa-
tient/me ginger snaps and bananas-all experiences I have 
lived empathically through her. I do not recall in my own 
life whether I have ever even had ginger snaps and bananas 
together, but I can almost taste them on my mind's tongne. 
Moreover, I sometimes recollect such empathic sensations 
more readily than does the patient from whom I have 
learned them! ... It is not merely my reaching into resonant 
experience from my own life (for example, that I have, paral-
lel to the patient, fond boyhood memories of eating cookies 
and feeling happy and secure). It is more: I now have memo-
63 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology 58 
(Basic Books, 1983). 
64 ld. 
65 See id at 59, 70. 
66 See Margulies, Empathic Imagination (cited in note 50). 
61 Id at 14-18. 
1994] Visions of Empathy 949 
ries empathically derived and elaborated into a relatively 
coherent form from someone else's experience.68 
Margulies seems to describe a version of empathy that requires 
therapists simultaneously to recognize the presence of the 
patient's self as unique and to strive through sheer imagination 
to understand it. While he acknowledges "the ultimate 
unknowability of the other,"69 it seems clear that this imagina-
tive exercise is useful only to the extent that it decreases that 
unknowability-to the extent, in other words, that it illuminates 
some portion of the truth about the patient's life to him or her. 
For the purposes here, the power of imaginative empathy70 
lies in its potential for curing at least some of the limitations of 
purely projective empathy. Imaginative empathy allows the 
empathizer to construct the other as a completely separate being, 
thereby fully acknowledging the other's diversity and removing 
the obstacles to perception one encounters in attempting to inject 
oneself into another's experience as a way of understanding it. 
Is imaginative empathy, then, an appropriate vehicle for 
transcending difference, for understanding and respecting others 
as unique and separate beings? This conclusion is too hasty. 
When we move from projective to imaginative empathy we can 
recapture diversity-but we lose any inherent connection to 
equality. 
Unlike projective empathy, imaginative empathy seeks at 
some level to set aside the empathizer's self in order to construct 
the other, thus enabling the empathizer to acknowledge and 
appreciate the diversity of the other. Empathy, which in its 
projective form is used to see through difference in order to per-
ceive essential humanity, is here deployed in order to accomplish 
the opposite result: to acknowledge and appreciate the essential 
difference of the other. And once difference becomes the root idea, 
empathy's necessary connection to equality disappears. 
In fact, this interpretation of empathy is entirely consistent 
with inequality in many familiar contexts. Not only is it unneces-
sary, for example, for a psychotherapist to assume that her pa-
tient is an equal-it may be unlikely or even impossible. Consid-
er that Sigmund Freud, who discussed the importance of empa-
68 Id at 54. 
69 Id at 57. 
70 Of course, both "projective" and "imaginative" empathy involve imagination. The 
name "imaginative empathy" is intended to emphasize the higher level of imagination 
necessary to construct the other when one's own self is taken out of the equation. 
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thy within the psychotherapeutic relationship, 71 also wrote that 
psychoanalysis presupposes "a situation in which there is a 
superior and a subordinate.m2 Here the empathizer is the 
''healthy" one, the "expert," the one with power and control, while 
the patient is the "sick" one, the weak one, who comes seeking 
help and guidance.73 
This depiction of imaginative empathy as intra-hierarchical 
has other close analogues. For example, many scholars of psy-
chology have written about the empathic relationship between 
mother and child.74 Like the interaction between psychothera-
pist and patient, the mother-child relation necessarily involves 
what might be called "benign domination," a situation where the 
party with control has expertise and strength that the powerless 
party needs to thrive. In both cases, we expect the dominator to 
use her powers of empathic understanding to help the other move 
toward independence, although even the existence of a power 
differential indicates the potential for abuse. 
A key point here is that the dominant party may not be the 
one with the greatest incentive to be empathic. The person at the 
bottom of the hierarchy must at some level be aware that his 
well-being depends on the powerful other, and so has good reason 
to learn that other's psychology in order to please her. Thus, 
therapists and mothers employ empathy out of goodness and/or 
professional commitment; patients and children learn it out of 
necessity. Those who wish to introduce empathy into the political 
71 See Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego 66, 70 n 2 
(Hogarth, 1948) (James Strachey, trans); Margulies, Empathic Imagination at xi (cited in 
note 50) (recounting this fact). 
72 Sigmund Freud, On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement 49 (Norton, 1966) 
(Joan Riviere, trans; James Strachey, ed). 
73 The image of hierarchy, and especially of the power of the empathizer, is brought 
home even more strongly (although perhaps unintentionally) by therapist Alfred 
Margulies, who opens Part One of The Empathic Imagination, "Toward Empathy," with 
the following quotation from Keats: "Then I felt like some watcher of the skies, When a 
new planet swims into his ken •..• " Margulies, Empathic Imagination at 2 (cited in note 
50). What a sense of the "watcher's" power Keats conveys! 
74 See, for example, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women's Development 7-9 (Harvard, 1982) (discussing the work of Nancy Chodorow on 
female development and its relationship to empathic mothering); Gardiner, Rhys, Stead, 
Lessing at 2 (cited in note 11) (discussing "mothering theory," which contends that women 
are socialized into empathic motherhood since "women's personalities develop in 
identification with their mothers through strong early bonds whose pleasures are so com-
pelling that women throughout their lives yearn for maternal nurturance and learn to 
give it to children, men, and other women"). But see Henderson, 85 Mich L Rev at 1582 
(cited in note 17) (discussing the "myth" that women are naturally more empathic than 
men). 
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process must first explore this phenomenon. Otherwise, a blanket 
endorsement of empathy might encourage those on the bottom to 
develop empathic understanding that is not reciprocated by those 
at the top. This would only fortify the power position of the latter 
and reinforce, rather than weaken, hierarchical social arrange-
ments. 
Once sought, the "bottom-up" variety of empathy is just as 
apparent as the "top-down" version.75 Consider two examples. 
The discussion above makes clear that women have long been 
sweepingly described as "naturally" empathic, and certainly they 
hold the top position in the mother-child hierarchy. But women's 
relation to men is generally the reverse-and their incentive to 
be empathic may be even stronger as wives and lovers than as 
parents. Learning to please male authority figures has been a 
prime element of women's socialization, and until very recently 
was integrally related to their survival and success in the world. 
Similarly, sociologist Robert Merton concluded that blacks, as 
victims of socially generated race-based hierarchy, have had the 
incentive to learn more about whites than whites have had to 
learn about blacks. His 1973 analysis of the racial "insider-out-
sider" phenomenon remains relevant: 
That the white-dominated society has long imposed social 
barriers which excluded Negroes from anything remotely 
like full participation in that society is now known to even 
the more unobservant whites. But what many of them have 
evidently not noticed is that the high walls of segregation do 
not at all separate whites and blacks symmetrically from 
intimate observation of the social life of the other. As social-
ly invisible men and women, blacks at work in white en-
claves have for centuries moved through or around the walls 
of segregation to discover with little effort what was on the 
other side. This was tantamount to their having access to a 
one-way screen. In contrast, the highly visible whites charac-
teristically did not want to find out about life in the black 
community and could not, even in those rare cases where 
they would. The structure of racial segregation meant that 
the whites who prided themselves on "understanding" Ne-
groes knew little more than their stylized role behaviors in 
75 In the psychotherapeutic context, Margulies discusses the incentives patients have 
to gain empathic understanding of the therapist. See Margulies, Empathic Imagination at 
98-99 (cited in note 50). 
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relation to whites and next to nothing of their private lives. 
AF, Arthur Lewis has noted, something of the same sort still 
obtains with the "integration" of many blacks into the larger 
society during the day coupled with segregation at night as 
blacks and whites return to their respective ghettos. In these 
ways, segregation can make for asymmetrical sensitivities 
across the divide. 76 
Imaginative empathy is thus at least as much a tool of sur-
vival for the powerless as of compassion and understanding for 
the powerful;·in both roles it can easily serve as the friend, rath-
er than the enemy, of social hierarchy.77 This fact should lead us 
to ask tough questions of those who· advocate its adoption as a 
political device. For example, just how do they propose to make 
empathy a tool of equality, rather than inequality? How will they 
levy this emotional progressive tax on social power, and motivate 
the socially powerful to reach out for understanding in the same 
way, and to at least the same extent that the socially powerless 
must? Jurisprudential arguments for imaginative empathy barely 
recognize, and certainly do not answer, these questions.78 
Perhaps imaginative empathy, as many pro-empathy argu-
ments imply, assumes the prior existence of hierarchy, but still 
76 Robert K Merton, Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge, 
78 Am J Soo 9, 30 (1972). 
77 Both liberal and radical feminists reject tbe celebration of "feminine empathy" for 
this reason. Radical theorist Catharine MacKinnon rejects tbe labelling of women as 
naturally "empathic" and relational, partly because she sees that the assignment of such 
personality roles both reflects and perpetuates male domination. See, for example, 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 38-39 (Harvard, 1987) (criticizing 
Gilligan for celebrating the idea that women's moral reasoning is morality "in a different 
voice" and commenting that "[w]omen value care because men have valued us according to 
the care we give them .... Women think in relational terms because our existence is 
defined in relation to men."). Liberal philosopher Jean Hampton agrees, noting that 
Gilligan's interviews with two children she calls Amy and Jake, indicating that girls are 
more relational or empathic than boys, may be more a cause for caution than celebration: 
I find it striking that these children's answers betray perspectives that seem to fit 
them perfectly for the kind of gendered roles that prevail in our society. In their 
archetypal forms, I hear the voice of a child who is preparing to be a member of a 
dominating group and the voice of another who is preparing to be a member of the 
group that is dominated. Neither of these voices should be allowed to inform our 
moral theorizing if such theorizing is going to be successful at formulating ways of 
interacting that are not only morally acceptable but which also attack the oppressive 
relationships that now hold in our society. 
Jean Hampton, Feminist Contractarianism, in Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt, eds, 
A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity 227, 231 (Westview, 
1993). 
78 See, for example, Daily, 102 Yale L J 1265 (cited in note 3). 
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produces results that weaken it-in other words, empathic at-
tempts to include marginalized groups might originate in hierar-
chy but nevertheless result in equality. From the discussion of 
Brown, above, we have seen that this might be true of projective 
empathy. Still, as the preceding discussion indicates, imaginative 
empathy has no innate connection to equality, and that conclu-
sion leaves us to doubt whether this form of empathy can combat 
social hierarchy at all. We have seen that, while those at the 
bottom have a strong incentive to learn empathic understanding 
of those at the top, the reverse is not automatically true. And 
without reciprocation from the powerful, empathy would almost 
certainly have the effect of keeping the powerless at the bottom. 
Where such ''bottom-up" empathy is present, perhaps even preva-
lent, imaginative empathy alone, while able to recognize diversi-
ty, cannot produce social or political equality. 79 
Finally, one could attempt to construct an argument for 
imaginative empathy that would rest on the prior existence of 
liberal ideas of equality. Once we have established liberalism, 
this argument would proceed, we should then employ imaginative 
empathy to enhance diversity. This view would not require one to 
make liberalism empathic per se, but would simply hope for 
peaceful coexistence between liberal equality and empathic diver-
sity, between projective and imaginative empathy. It is certainly 
true that accounts of empathy as a tool in psychotherapy have 
discussed the use of empathic understanding as involving ele-
ments of both projective and imaginative empathy,80 and this 
idea has found its way into legal accounts of empathy.81 How-
ever, that move from psychology to politics and law is extremely 
problematic. It may already be clear from the preceding discus-
sion that the two concepts of empathy are not merely different-
but-compatible substances, like political salt and pepper; rather, 
they are mutually destructive. Imaginative empathy could work 
79 Does a third type of empathy exist, one that involves an exercise in projection that 
results in appreciating diversity? If so, it must share the same problems I have raised for 
imaginative empathy; indeed, the problems may be greater. If I project myself into your 
body and realize that even when living in your circumstances I would not make the same 
choices or have the same views, it would surely be difficult to find any essential sameness 
between us that could give rise to a feeling of equality. I am indebted to Jeffrie Murphy 
for discussion that clarified this idea. 
80 See, for example, Robert L. Katz, Empathy: Its Nature and Uses 26-54 (Free Press, 
1963) (describing stages of empathy that involve "oscillating between identification and 
detachment"). Katz does not discuss projective and imaginative empathy per se. 
81 See, for example, Henderson, 85 Mich L Rev at 1586 (cited in note 17) (identifying 
empathy as "affect plus cognition"). 
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to destroy equality; projective empathy to mute or erase diversi-
ty. Choosing between the two thus involves exploring the impor-
tance of the underlying values they further. 
EMPATHY AS POLITICAL V ALlUM 
Understanding the conflicts inherent in advocating "political 
empathy'' .has obvious implications for scholarly attempts to re-
place or reform liberalism by introducing empathic community. 
But, still more significantly, the preceding discussion highlights a 
serious underlying political problem that is largely masked by 
vague endorsements of empathic understanding. That problem is 
the apparent conflict between the political values of diversity and 
equality (as those concepts are defined and defended by contem-
porary opponents of liberalism), and particularly the implicit 
attack on the latter by the former.82 Minimal, but necessary, 
assumptions about the sameness of all human individuals, an 
identity of being that justifies equal treatment under the rules 
established by liberal law, are fundamental to liberal equality.83 
And indeed, upon what basis other than sameness can equality 
be justified? Diversity advocates must perceive one, since they 
are able to announce their devotion to equality and diversity 
while simultaneously denouncing legal and political equality 
based on liberal abstractions about the individual self.84 But 
how can one not make such assumptions if one is concerned with 
establishing equality? If we look only at differences among peo-
ple, at human diversity, then we are left with no basis for politi-
cal equality or legal rules that respect it. Furthermore, such 
blind insistence on diversity forms the basis for an attack on 
equality, an attack that confronts diversity advocates with a 
choice between these two core values that they presumably wish 
to avoid. 
82 So-called liberal diversity rests on liberal visions of th~ self; the essential idea is 
that humans all have a capacity to run their own lives. That capacity both justifies liberal 
equal rights and argues for minimal interference with them, so that each autonomous, 
rational, self-directed person has the "right" to her own life as long as she does not violate 
the similar rights of others. Radical diversity appears te be based on a different idea, the 
notion that recognizing diversity requires rejecting any universally applicable selfhood. 
These differing uses of diversity explain the complaints of some critics that liberalism 
denies diversity. See generally Young, Ideal of Community (cited in note 53). 
83 John Rawls, for example, appears to concede this point in A Theory of Justice 504-
08 (Harvard, 1971). 
"' See generally Matsuda, 16 NM L Rev at 613, 629-30 (cited in note 53). 
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Empathy can offer no escape from this choice, for endorsing 
it as a political principle requires analysis of its content, and 
such analysis collapses back into the choice being avoided. That 
is, projective empathy is premised on the liberal equality 
communitarians would reject, but limits the recognition of bot-
tomless diversity. On the other hand, imaginative empathy intro-
duces the danger of sacrificing equality for diversity. 
In the end, advocating political empathy is a cop-out. One of 
the toughest questions that the ''liberal communitarians" face is 
how to increase our sense of community without impermissibly 
violating our freedom. In the face of evidence that political empa-
thy is not natural, must be learned, and is present to a signifi-
cantly different degree in different individuals,85 questions im-
mediately arise as to how this empathic democracy is to be 
achieved. These are very uncomfortable questions because they 
raise issues of coercion, forced change of personality, and political 
monitoring of individual psychology. Simply advocating "empa-
thy," without more, hides these issues beneath a cloak of 
voluntariness, as if the use of the "empathy" label alone would 
magically produce this quality in enough abundance to convince 
the politically and socially powerful to give up, or at least to 
share with the less fortunate, advantages that many have spent 
their lives acquiring and that have become integral to their sense 
of self. Empathy is political Valium: it neither changes the polity 
nor maps out a plan for achieving change; it simply makes us 
less anxious about the fact of social inequality and less deter-
mined to confront the hard questions about how, or even wheth-
er, to end it. 
85 See, for example, text accompanying note 27. 
